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Abstract 
Since his death at the hands of the South African security police on 12 September 1977, much 
has been written in medical, legal and other literature about Steve Biko. This dissertation 
explores the medical literature and finds that the vast majority of authors, when writing about 
Biko, refer primarily to his death, the role of the medical profession in the events leading up to 
his death, and the ethical issues regarding dual loyalties that arise from studying those issues.  
 
In my research question I ask: Does Steve Biko have more to offer medical ethics than his 
death? In exploring Steve Biko’s writings as collected together in I Write What I Like, I find an 
underlying thinking which guided Biko’s philosophy. I show that this underlying philosophy is 
nothing other than the philosophy which underlies ubuntu and I explore how ubuntu should 
influence our medical ethical thinking and suggest that this could be Biko’s real contribution to 
medical ethics, namely an ethic that takes seriously the  contribution that African moral 
thinking has to make in the field of medical ethics, a contribution that does nothing less than 
give to medical ethics a more human face, a contribution which Biko himself believed was 
what Africa was still to give to the world, a more human face.  
 
I critically review the writings and philosophy of Steve Biko and identify key notions or 
conceptions that are of relevance to medical ethics and then explore the impact and relevance 
of these key notions and conceptions to the fundamental bioethical issues of autonomy, dignity 
and confidentiality. I defend the normative claim that integrating Biko’s and other salient 
African ethical conceptions into our predominantly Western bioethical thinking is a moral 
requirement. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
 
In this research report I will argue that Steve Biko has a great deal more to offer 
medical ethics than merely ethical implications of the memory of his cruel and tragic 
death at the hands of the South African security police in 1977, and the behaviour of 
his attending doctors which form the most common discussion points when Steve 
Biko is discussed in the context of medical ethics. 
 
Agreeing with Braude (2009: 2054) that while much has been written about Biko 
since his death “there has been surprisingly scant philosophical attention to Biko”, I 
will focus on Biko’s belief that “the great powers of the world may have done 
wonders in giving the world an industrial and military look, but the great gift still has 
to come from Africa – giving the world a more human face” (Biko 2010: 51) and 
argue that, for Biko, that more human/humane face would be given to the world 
through the understanding and appreciation of the philosophical concepts that 
underlie what is commonly called ubuntu. While I will describe ubuntu in much more 
detail later, it has at its core the “more spiritual, communitarian, nature-friendly 
approach” described by Zijlstra (2008), who in seeking to relate Biko’s philosophy to 
modern European philosophy, locates him in Romanticism which she suggests could 
even be postmodernism. She describes him as: 
thinking more coherently and reasoning as a matter of course in terms of 
individual rights and modern-technical-instrumental thinking on the one 
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hand, and on the other hand in terms of the more spiritual, communitarian, 
nature-friendly approach that values tradition. I think this suggests a 
theme for modern or, if you like, postmodern philosophy (2008: 9).  
 
She contests that some elements of Biko’s thought that one might read as Romantic 
could also be read as postmodern, as opposed to more modern aspects of his thought, 
for example, the idea of the retrieval of tradition. “Counter to a tendency to read Biko 
as postmodern, one can regard him as thinking ‛big’: black consciousness, ‛the 
Westerner’, African culture and the like” (2008:9). More (2004: 213) quotes Richard 
Fawkes, cited in The Sunday Star, May 31, 1992, “The thing about Biko that appealed 
to me is that he doesn’t conform to the standard Freedom Fighter image. Mandela 
might have been more typical but…he is very much in the tradition of Kenyatta or 
Nyerere…Steve Biko was much more of a philosopher.” 
 Arnold (1978: xx) on the other hand, does not see in Biko a “soaring philosophical 
visionary” but rather a pragmatist who could “bring immediacy to theory”. While 
Biko’s role as a philosopher might be contended, I nonetheless will argue that Steve 
Biko would see our current discourses on medical ethics as too Eurocentric in the 
sense that they do not relate to the majority of African peoples' experiences of health 
and healing. Flowing from this will be an affirmation of recent trends towards 
mainstreaming of African ethics into the teaching curriculum and a call for this 
process to be given prominence in the future.  
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My research question arose in my mind when I questioned why the University of the 
Witwatersrand’s Centre for Bioethics has the name Steve Biko Centre for Bioethics. 
During my course work in pursuance of an MSc Med (Bioethics and Health Law) at 
the Steve Biko Centre for Bioethics during 2010 and 2011, the only references made 
to Steve Biko were in relation to his death and the ethical issues surrounding his 
medical care while in detention, mainly in the context of dual loyalties. His own, quite 
unique and well recorded philosophy, the primary source of which is I Write What I 
Like, was never referred to as perhaps having an influence on the way in which we 
ought to do ethics. Surely the editorial comment in Biko’s I Write What I Like 
(2010:167) that “his final word would be his death itself” does not mean that Biko has 
nothing more than his death to say to the field of medicine and medical ethics in 
particular. Although he was a medical student at the University of Natal Medical 
School, Mangcu (2012: 189) records that he was excluded in 1972 on academic 
grounds because, six years into his studies, he was repeating third year. Arnold (1978: 
xvi) records that once at university, “Biko soon lost interest in medicine and began to 
concern himself with the daily oppression that Blacks faced.” However, although he 
never opined on things medical, even a cursory reading of Steve Biko’s writings leads 
to a conclusion that an exploration of his thinking will open up the opportunity for 
considering uniquely African input into our philosophical thinking in the area of 
medical ethics. One of my premises is that he would question seeing ethics solely 
through the lens of western philosophical thinking. I have come to believe that Steve 
Biko would not ask ‘what can African moral thinking add to Western philosophical 
thought?’, but rather ‘what does Western philosophical thought add to millennia old 
African moral thinking?’ My review of the literature indicates that this contribution 
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that Steve Biko’s thinking might make in the area of medical ethics has not been 
explored.  
 
I suggest that Steve Biko clearly articulated his belief that there is a uniquely African 
view, a uniquely African contribution waiting to be gifted to the wider world. I will 
show that this viewpoint/contribution is nothing other than the thinking/philosophy of 
ubuntu, although this is a word he never actually uses. While opinions vary regarding 
the uniqueness of ubuntu as an ethical vision, I will argue that it is this philosophy 
which should inform the teaching, understanding and development of, amongst other 
things, medical ethics within the African context. The following, each of which will 
be given more detailed attention later in this report, are my main reasons for this 
claim: 
Firstly, there is a characteristically African way of understanding health and healing 
which is usually based on the following features of African ethics: ancestors, 
community and cosmology/spirituality (Murove 2009, Mndende 1996, Mazrui 1994, 
Waite 1992).  
Secondly, certain concepts (autonomy, consent and privacy) that are integral to 
bioethics in the Western tradition are sometimes unintelligible within the African 
context (Metz and Gaie 2010, Kasenene 2000, Coetzee and Roux 1998).  
Thirdly, the philosophy of disease and causation differs from context to context due to 
underlying cosmological assumptions. For example, on the basis of Western 
mechanistic philosophical assumptions, the germ theory of disease provides the 
foundation for diagnosis and treatment. In the African understanding of healing, 
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disease has cosmological and ontological origins. Cosmologically disease and health 
have their ultimate explanation in a web of relationships between the living and their 
ancestors (Omonzejele 2008, Straker 1993).  
Finally, since the wellbeing of an individual is taken as the wellbeing of everybody in 
the community, healing is integral to communal therapy through rituals that usually 
bring the community together. In this regard the individual's healing is a communal 
affair that takes place within the communal context of a symbiotic relationship that 
exists between the living and their ancestors (Turner 2011, Richardson 2009, Csordas 
and Lewton 1998).  
 
1.2 Background literature analysis and critique 
 
In writing about Steve Biko in his Long Walk to Freedom (Mandela: 1994), Nelson 
Mandela says; “We must not allow his contribution to be forgotten”. Mangcu (2012: 
313) comments on fundraising events that took place in 1998 and suggests that 
“Biko’s name had been erased from public memory and something needed to be done 
to correct this injustice.” These two statements sum up the goal of this research report, 
namely, to not allow his legacy to be forgotten.  
 
The primary source of Biko’s thinking is to be found in the collection of his writings 
entitled I Write What I Like (Biko 2010) and to a far lesser degree in the recording of 
his testimony at the Terrorism Trial of 1976 in Millard Arnold’s Steve Biko: Black 
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Consciousness in South Africa (Arnold: 1978). These will be my main sources as an 
entry portal into Steve Biko’s thinking. 
 
General commentaries and commentators on Biko’s life (Boesak 2009, Ramphele 
1995, Price 1992) all provide historical background, but few delve or venture into his 
philosophical thinking, and none into his influence on modern philosophical thinking. 
Woods (1991) and Mangcu (2012) do go some way in attempting to describe his 
philosophy: Woods summarising it as a philosophy that can be summed up in the 
words “people were important” (1991: 77), and Mangcu going to great effort to place 
Biko’s philosophical outlook in the broader intellectual history of what he calls 19th 
century Xhosa prophet intellectuals (2012: 33-78). Both these authors, together with 
Onno Zijlstra (2008) explore the influences on Biko’s philosophy beyond that of 
Fanon and Cesaire, the place where most writers tend to stop (Campbell 2012, Gibson 
2008, Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001). 
 
There is no shortage of literature dealing with Biko’s death and the dual loyalties 
narrative, all of which seem to affirm that what has been written about Biko and 
medical ethics has largely focussed on his death and has not considered other ways in 
which his thought might be of relevance to medical ethics. On the 30th anniversary of 
Biko’s death, The Lancet published an article, Biko to Guantanamo: 30 years of 
medical involvement in torture (Nicholl et al. 2007), the title of which emphasises the 
need for my thesis question. 
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The McLean and Jenkins 2003 article The Steve Biko Affair: A Case Study in Medical 
Ethics (2003: 77) states that “over the years we have discussed the Biko affair in 
medical ethics courses for students of medicine and the allied medical 
disciplines…hence we offer this dissection of the case to other students and teachers 
of medical ethics”. The article then dissects the death of Biko and the involvement 
and unethical behaviour of his attending doctors, particularly from the point of view 
of dual loyalties. This is the common approach/premise adopted by most authors 
(Alencar and Crock 2010, Williams 2009, Wilson 2009, Miles et al. 2008, London et 
al. 2007, Gready and de Gruchy 2003, London and McCarthy 1998, Dowdall 1991, 
Baxter 1985 and many more). 
 
My reading of my primary source mentioned above, Steve Biko’s I Write What I Like, 
leads to my premise that his thinking regarding African culture is deeply influenced 
by the African moral theory encapsulated in ubuntu, an ethical concept of southern 
African origin which I will enlarge upon in due course. Many have written on the 
topic of ubuntu (Mnyaka and Mothlabi 2005, Kamwangamalu 1999, Battle 1997, 
Mandela 1994, Shutte 1993, Sparks 1990, Mbiti 1969 and many more) and 
increasingly more is being written regarding African moral theory, ubuntu and its 
possible influence on Western moral thinking (Metz 2010, Bamford 2007), Ubuntu 
and its influence on the Constitution of South Africa (Cornell 2010, Mokgoro 1998) 
and on medical ethics in particular  (Chuwa 2014, Metz 2010, Murove 2009). 
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1.3 Outline of Dissertation 
 
In this dissertation I will critically review the writings and philosophy of Steve Biko 
in order to identify any key notions or conceptions that are of relevance to medical 
ethics. I will argue that some of the key notions and conceptions that require 
consideration are, firstly, his contention that African culture and ethical thinking 
didn’t begin with the arrival of the European settlers, but rather already existed 
mainly in oral form. This will then lead, secondly, to an in depth exploration of his 
understanding of African culture, which among other things will show his unashamed 
identification with African communalism and the importance he places on spiritualty. 
I will then, thirdly, discuss the philosophical principles which form the basis of 
ubuntu, one of which is communalism, and will conclude that although Biko never 
uses the word ubuntu, his philosophy is nothing other than the philosophy of ubuntu.  
 
I will argue that another key conception of relevance to medical ethics is his 
understanding of what he calls true integration. The relevance of this will manifest 
itself when defending the normative claim that integrating Biko’s and other salient 
African ethical conceptions into our predominantly Western ethical thinking is a 
moral requirement. 
 
Having identified culture, communalism, ubuntu, spirituality and integration as some 
of the key elements of Biko’s philosophy pertaining to medical ethics, I will explore 
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the impact of these key notions and conceptions on selected bioethical issues such as 
autonomy, consent, privacy and dignity. I will review the current critique of the 
prominence given to autonomy and examine how applying the principles of ubuntu 
affect the African understanding and application of autonomy, consent and privacy. 
Regarding dignity, I will examine how dignity is conferred by respecting culture and 
how this impacts the cultural and spiritual role played by traditional health 
practitioners, bearing in mind the importance of spirituality in African culture. I will 
argue that traditional health practitioners ought to be integrated into ethical medical 
practice. 
I will conclude by defending the normative claim that integrating Biko’s and other 
salient African ethical conceptions into our predominantly Western bioethical 
thinking is a moral requirement. 
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2. Critical review of the writings and philosophy of Steve Biko in 
order to identify any key notions or conceptions that are of relevance 
to medical ethics 
2.1 African culture and ethical thinking didn’t begin with the arrival of 
the European settlers. 
 
According to Valsiner (Valsiner 2007 cited in Pillai and Chaudhary 2009: 239-239), 
“culture operates at the mentalistic and social planes of human existence. The central 
thesis of his work is that culture is created through mind and society, and in turn, 
provides the substance from which the mind and society are actualized.” Biko’s 
definition of culture was that it is essentially society’s composite answer to the  varied 
problems of life which arise day by day and that “whatever we do adds to the richness 
of our cultural heritage” as long as it always has people at its centre (2010: 106). It 
was Biko’s belief that “our culture must be defined in concrete terms” (2010: 76). He 
believed that the past needed to be related to the present in order to demonstrate the 
historical evolution of the modern black person. He rejected outright the tendency to 
think of black culture as a static culture that was arrested in 1652 and that had not 
developed since. He believed that one of the processes of colonisation was to devour 
the indigenous culture and leave behind a “bastard culture” (2010: 106) that may only 
thrive at the pace allowed it by the dominant culture. The bastardisation of black 
culture is a common theme in Biko’s thinking which he countered with the strong 
held belief that the “basic tenets of our culture have largely succeeded in withstanding 
the process of bastardisation (2010: 106). Mangcu (2012: 272) identifies Biko’s 
unique contribution as his vision, on a wide scale, of the interrelationship between 
consciousness and culture, on the one hand, and developmental and political action on 
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the other. He believes that this “stands in sharp contrast to South Africa’s recent 
leaders who, in creation of a democratic society, have concentrated on the latter 
without sufficient attention to the former” (2012: 273). While Biko was certainly not 
the first person to discover the centrality of culture as a tool for self-empowerment 
and political action, this belief certainly seems to play itself out when he says “the 
great powers in the world may have done wonders in giving the world an industrial 
and military look but the great gift still has to come from Africa – giving the world a 
more human face” (2010: 51). He makes this statement in the context of verbalising 
his belief that it is difficult to kill the African heritage and it is my contention that it is 
Biko’s understanding of  African cultural heritage (his description of which follows in 
2.2) that can influence our current western dominated ethical thinking and give it a 
more human face.  
 
Biko does not contend for separation on the basis of cultural differences, but rather, in 
his own words “I am sufficiently proud to believe that under a normal situation, 
Africans can comfortably stay with people of other cultures and be able to contribute 
to the joint cultures of the communities they have joined” (2010: 50). When I explore 
his somewhat unique understanding of integration, the importance of this belief will 
become apparent.  
 
Am I arguing for cultural relativism? According to Duncker (1939: 39) the thesis of 
ethical relativism has found its classical formulation in Locke's Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding: "He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind and 
look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with indifferency survey their actions, 
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will be able to satisfy himself, that there is scarce that principle of morality to be 
named, or rule of virtue to be thought on (those only excepted that are absolutely 
necessary to hold society together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct 
societies), which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general 
fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living 
quite opposite to others." Bearing this in mind I will not argue for cultural relativity, 
but will argue, with Wiredu that:  
relativity to culture can have another connotation. It might mean simply 
that the ways in which certain aspects of life and reality have actually 
been conceptualized and evaluated are relative to culture…Assuming 
relevant diversity, this means that certain concepts and values are not 
universal among the different cultures of the world. This might be called 
descriptive relativism. It notices difference; it does not canonize it. It 
leaves open the possibility of dialogue among cultures. Some, including 
me, might not want to call this relativism unless a suitable rider is 
attached (2004: 13). 
He goes on to contend along thought lines similar to Biko’s that the forced 
universalisation of the modes of thought of a colonising culture affects for the worse 
intellectual relations between cultures. 
Accordingly, pointing out the lack of universality in certain modes of 
conceptualization in Western philosophy could be a first step in the 
clarification of an African mode of thought. Another step would, of 
course, still await being taken, and that is the comparative evaluation of 
both the African and the Western conceptions (2004: 14). 
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It is not my intention to pursue either of the two options above per se, but rather, as I 
now turn to Biko’s description of African culture, to lift what was seen as precious to 
Biko in African culture and explore how that can be integrated into our current 
Western ethical thinking. 
 
2.2 Biko’s understanding of African culture  
 
Biko (quite correctly, in my opinion) lays a great deal of the blame for the 
bastardisation of African culture at the door of the European Christian missionary 
movement. As will become evident, he places great stress and value on spirituality 
but, based on his understanding of true integration (2.3 below), not in the dominance 
of any one spirituality over or at the cost of another. Biko, in The Church as seen by a 
young layman (2010: 58-65) sets forth his philosophy regarding religion and its effect 
on culture, describing religion as a “social institution attempting to explain what 
cannot be scientifically known about the origin and destiny of man” (2010: 59). This, 
he suggests: 
 sets forth the necessity of religion. All societies and indeed all 
individuals, ancient or modern, young or old, identify themselves with a 
particular religion and when none is existent, they develop one. In most 
cases religion is intricately intertwined with the rest of the cultural traits 
of society. To his mind this makes the religion part and parcel of the 
behavioural pattern of that society and makes the people bound by the 
limits of that religion through a strong identification with it (2010: 59).  
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Biko believed that early Christianity was sensitive to these truths and had itself “gone 
through rigorous cultural adaptation from ancient Judea through Rome, through 
London, through Brussels and Lisbon, yet somehow when it landed at the Cape, it 
was made to look fairly rigid. Christianity was made the central point of a culture 
which brought with it new styles of clothing, new customs, new forms of etiquette 
and new medical approaches” (2010: 60). This then led to the bastardisation of black 
culture as the people amongst whom Christianity was spread “had to cast away their 
indigenous clothing, their customs, their beliefs, which were all described as being 
pagan and barbaric” (2010: 60). Biko stands against this process and the 
presuppositions that support it, in fact “I am against the fact that a settler minority 
should impose an entire system of values on an indigenous people” and “a country in 
Africa must inevitably exhibit African values and be truly African in style” (2010: 
26). These statements sum up my primary premise. It’s to these “African values” that 
I now turn. 
 
  2.2.1 African values that Biko cherished 
Overview 
Dube (2009: 212) contends that the collapse and lack of effectiveness of African 
cultures do not lie in the poverty of ideas, but rather in living in a cosmology whose 
values are dismissed, submerged, unofficial and marginalised, with western 
perspectives often functioning as the official standard and he calls on African ethicists 
to work within their communities to recapture and re-interpret indigenous values for 
contemporary contexts and concerns. 
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The following are indigenous or African values that Biko believed “should teach the 
westerner a lesson or two” and are “characteristics that we must not allow ourselves 
to lose” (2010: 32). 
 
To Biko the most fundamental aspect of south African culture is the importance it 
attaches to people, “Ours has always been a Man-centred society” (2010: 45). 
Africans speak to each other, much to the surprise of Westerners, not for the point of 
arriving at a particular conclusion, but merely to enjoy conversation itself. Intimacy is 
a term not just for particular friendships, but applies to a whole group of people who 
find themselves together. In African culture there is no such thing as two friends, 
“intruders” are welcomed, and secrets, joys and woes are commonly shared out of a 
deep concern for each other. 
 
The African culture is not a suspicious one. He sees in western culture an attitude to 
see people not as themselves but as agents for some particular function either to one’s 
disadvantage or advantage, but this is not so in African culture where the inherent 
goodness of people is believed in (2010: 46). 
 
“We regard our living together not as an unfortunate mishap but as a deliberate act of 
God to make us a community of brothers and sisters jointly involved in the quest for a 
composite answer to the problems of life” (2010: 46). Thus all action is usually joint 
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community orientated action rather than the “individualism which is the hallmark of 
the capitalist approach” (2010: 46). People are never used as stepping stones. 
While he writes quite a bit on music, song and rhythm in African culture, I only 
highlight a remark of his that songs are never for individuals. “All African songs are 
group songs” (2010: 47). 
 
Regarding property he stresses the community basis of African culture and its 
unindividualism. Although farming and agriculture are often on an individual family 
basis, they have many characteristics of joint efforts. One of the consequences of this 
is that individual poverty is a foreign concept. Poverty can only be brought about on 
an entire community.  
 
It is while being cross examined in the Terrorism Trial of nine of his colleagues in 
May 1977 that Biko came the closest to giving a name to his philosophy. The 
statements Biko makes are in the context of the responsibility of the state in the 
economic welfare of the community. Arnold (1978: 89ff) records that Biko was asked 
to read the following from a document: “Black communalism, the philosophy of our 
fathers, is based on the basic respect of the Black man for the sacred value of the 
human individual as the basis for the existence of communities and governments.” He 
was then asked whether that expressed the principle in his approach, to which he 
replied: “Yes it does” (1978: 90). 
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Another important aspect of African culture for Biko is “our mental attitude to 
problems presented by life in general” (2010: 48). He contrasts the western problem-
solving approach with African situation-experiencing. Africans experience a situation 
rather than face a problem. 
He describes Africans as deeply religious. While there are various forms of worship 
throughout the continent, there is a common basis in that “we all accept without any 
doubt the existence of a God” (2010: 49). He quotes and agrees with Dr Kenneth 
Kaunda in describing Africans as not recognising any cleavage between the natural 
and the supernatural. Quoting Kaunda again “our people may be unlettered and their 
physical horizons may be limited yet they inhabit a larger world than the sophisticated 
westerner who has magnified his physical senses through gadgets at the price all too 
often of cutting out the dimension of the spiritual” (2010: 51). 
 
He believes that African Culture spells out Africans as a people particularly close to 
nature.  
 
In Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity (2010: 96-108) he once 
again bemoans the bastardisiation of African culture by the settlers and sets out to 
reject the “individualistic, cold approach to life that is the cornerstone Anglo-Boer 
culture” (2010: 106). Instead he posits turning to elements of black culture I have 
identified above and, believing in an inherent freedom he identifies in black culture, 
to develop current black culture:  “Black culture above all implies freedom on our 
part to innovate without recourse to white values. This innovation is part of the 
natural development of any culture” (2010: 106). 
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Summary 
It is important to note that when Biko describes African culture as he does above 
(how rose-tinted his view may be is not relevant to the current topic) he believes that 
these are “fundamental aspects of the pure African culture in the present day African” 
(2010: 44) [own emphasis]. 
In summary, Biko’s words are best quoted in full:  
In rejecting Western values, therefore, we are rejecting those things that are 
not only foreign to us but that seek to destroy the most cherished of our 
beliefs – that the corner-stone of society is man himself – not just his 
welfare, not his material wellbeing but just man himself with all his 
ramifications. We reject the power-based society of the Westerner that seems 
to be ever concerned with perfecting their technological know-how while 
losing out on their spiritual dimension. We believe that in the long run the 
special contribution to the world by Africa will be in this field of human 
relationship. The great powers of the world may have done wonders in 
giving the world an industrial and military look, but the greatest gift still has 
to come from Africa – giving the world a more human face (2010: 51). 
 
  2.2.2 Ubuntu 
Many authors work from the premise that it is ubuntu that underlies Biko’s thinking. 
Dube (2009: 83) states that “ubuntu would be what Biko terms a ‘special contribution 
to the world in the field of human relations’, ‘giving the world a more human face.’”  
Mnyaka and Motlhabi (2009: 67) in speaking of Biko’s understanding of human 
dignity, believe it is “ubuntu that permeates his belief that the human person has 
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dignity from cradle to and beyond the grave.” Mangcu (2012: 282) speaks of Biko’s 
knowledge of ubuntu. I believe one cannot assume that Biko’s thought is ubuntu 
thought, but rather that one ought to prove that it is such. Thus, having described 
some of the features of Black culture that were cherished by Biko, I now turn to the 
concept of ubuntu, and then look for areas of commonality in order to deduce whether 
it is fair to equate Biko’s thought with the thought that underlies ubuntu.  
  
Overview 
According to Teffo (1994: 5), “The ethos of ubuntu...is one single gift that African 
philosophy can bequeath on other philosophies of the world.” This statement has 
echoes of Biko’s “special contribution” and “gift” mentioned above.  
 
Definition 
On ubuntu, Maphisa (1994: 8) states that “South Africans are slowly re-discovering 
their common humanity. Gone are the days when people were stripped of their dignity 
(ubuntu) through harsh laws. Gone are the days when people had to use ubulwane [i.e. 
animal like behaviour] to uphold or reinforce those laws. I suggest that the 
transformation of an apartheid South Africa into a democracy is a re-discovery of 
ubuntu.” Louw (1998: 8) quotes the South African Governmental White Paper on 
Welfare as officially recognising ubuntu as: “The principle of caring for each other's 
well-being...and a spirit of mutual support...Each individual's humanity is ideally 
expressed through his or her relationship with others and theirs in turn through a 
recognition of the individual's humanity. Ubuntu means that people 
 
 
20 
through other people. It also acknowledges both the rights and the responsibilities of 
every citizen in promoting individual and societal well-being”.  
 
Tshoose (2009: 14) acknowledges that the concept ubuntu, like many African 
concepts, is not easily definable: 
because to define an African notion in a foreign language and from an 
abstract as opposed to a concrete approach is to defy the very essence of 
the African world-view and can also be particularly elusive. In an attempt 
to define it, scholars have described the concept generally as a world-view 
of African societies and a determining factor in the formation of 
perceptions, which influence social conduct. It has also been described as 
a philosophy of life, which in its most fundamental sense represents 
personhood, humanity, humaneness and morality; it is a metaphor that 
describes group solidarity where such group solidarity is central to the 
survival of communities with a scarcity of resources, where the 
fundamental belief is that “motho ke motho ka batho ba bangwe/umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu which, literally translated, means a person can only 
be a person through others (2009: 15).  
In other words the individual’s whole existence is relative to that of the group and this 
becomes manifested in anti-individualistic conduct towards the survival of the group 
if the individual is to survive. 
 
In ubuntu, from the time people are born they are caught up in a world of ethical 
relations and obligations and the social bond is thus not conceived as one of separate 
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individuals. Cornell and Muvanga interestingly describe this as an “inscription by the 
other” (2012: 10) which is fundamental in that we are born into a language, a kinship 
group, a tribe, a nation. But this inscription is not simply reduced to a social fact. We 
come into the world obligated to others, and in turn these others are obligated to us, to 
the individual.  They thus point out that it is a profound misunderstanding of ubuntu 
to confuse it with simple-minded communitarianism: “It is only through the 
engagement and support of others that we are able to realise a true individuality and 
rise above our biological distinctiveness into a fully developed person whose 
uniqueness is inseparable from the journey to moral and ethical development” (2012: 
10). Chuwa (2014: 38) takes this distinction from communitarianism further when he 
describes one of the distinguishing features of ubuntu ethics as the significant role of 
community in comparison to that of individuals in any particular ethical situation: 
“Ubuntu ethics is based on, has as its goal, and is validated by societal common good. 
The role of community in Ubuntu ethics is based on the premise that none of 
community members would be what he or she is without the community. Thus, 
naturally the community takes precedence over the individual without 
underestimating individual  personal rights. The objective of Ubuntu ethics is the 
balance between individual rights and the necessary communitarian conditions which 
facilitate and support those rights. Each member of the community has a right to self-
determination which finds its limitation in common good (2014: 39).  
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Spiritualty 
Ubuntu is a “cultural ethos, a spirituality” says Pato (1997: 53). Regarding religion 
and spirituality, Nabudere explains why ubuntu philosophy and religion have no 
separate and specific theologies:  
Metaphysics is part of the ubuntu philosophy and recognises that people 
live in a world of uncertainty. The world of uncertainty includes the 
reality of death, which all human beings must suffer. But for most 
Africans, like Christians, death does not mean the disappearance of the 
dead from beingness. Africans believe that the dead continue to exist in a 
spirit form and as such they are recognised as the living-dead or ancestors. 
Ubuntu philosophy holds that the living dead can, when called upon by 
the living, intercede and advise them in certain circumstances. Such 
intercession is crucial in many healing and reconciliation rituals in which 
the ancestors, invisible beings, play a significant role. In addition to the 
living-dead, there are also the un-born who are recognised to exist in the 
future. As such the living are required to ensure that the un-born are 
brought into the world and provided for (2005: 4).  
 
Nafukho (2006) likewise describes ubuntu as “decidedly religious.” In African 
families, spirituality plays a key role in society and unites ancestors with the living 
and the extended family. Dying is considered an ultimate homecoming. Thus, not 
only must the living and the dead share with and care for one another, but the living 
and the dead depend on one another. African people use ancestors as mediators 
between them and God. In African societies, there is an inextricable bond between 
 
 
23 
humans, ancestors, and the Supreme Being. “Ubuntu, therefore, implies a deep 
respect and regard for religious beliefs and practices that are supposed to guide all 
human life endeavors” (2006: 409). 
 
Communalism 
Several authors (Ogunbanjo and Knapp van Bogaert: 2005, Venter: 2004, 
Kamwangamalu: 1999, Boykin: 1997) identify communalism as a core value of 
ubuntu. Gyekye (1997: 35-76) identifies a moderate and a radical form of 
communalism and he argues that it is radical communalism that has been espoused by 
some African authors that has given rise to tyranny, political intolerance and 
authoritarianism. He argues for a moderate communalism which gives 
accommodation to communal values as well as to values of individuality, to social 
commitments as well as to responsibilities to oneself. It is this latter form of 
communalism that I will suggest comes closest to Biko’s confessed communalism. 
 
Compare/contrast Biko’s philosophy with Ubuntu philosophy 
It seems clear when reading Biko’s description of African culture and the various 
qualities of ubuntu that it is safe to say that ubuntu informed and underlies his 
thinking,  that ubuntu would be what Biko terms a ‘special contribution to the world 
in the field of human relations’, ‘giving the world a more human face.’ Nussbaum 
(2009: 100) once again has echoes of Biko when she writes: “I write from a 
strengthening conviction that Africa has something important to contribute to the 
change of heart needed in the world…if we are to survive, the peoples of the world 
must embrace a new sense of interconnectedness as one global community…I seek to 
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articulate some of the beauty and power of Ubuntu, the underlying social philosophy 
of African culture.” 
 
Thus, the answer to my question, Does Steve Biko have more to offer medical ethics 
than his death? is a resounding Yes! What he has to offer is the philosophy of ubuntu 
which informed all of his thinking regarding culture and what it means to be human, 
but before exploring how that ought to affect our ethical thinking it is necessary to 
explore his understanding of what he calls true integration. 
 
  2.3 Integration 
 
While each English dictionary defines integrate with its own words, the meaning in 
each is to bring together or incorporate into a unified, harmonious, or interrelated 
whole or system; to combine to produce a whole or larger unit. Integration is then the 
act or process of integrating. When used in a racial context it is the bringing together 
of people of different racial or ethnic groups into unrestricted and equal association. 
At this point in this dissertation it ought to be clear that my thesis is that as long as 
Biko’s influence on medical ethics in South Africa, and ubuntu’s influence on 
universal medical ethics, remain at their current low level of influence, what we have 
is ethics which are not whole. Biko’s understanding of true integration can help us 
regarding how to make ethics whole or complete. 
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Biko, in Black Souls in White Skins (2010: 20-28), Definition of Black Consciousness 
(2010: 52-57) and Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity (2010: 
96-108) defines integration in a unique way (admittedly in the context of apartheid 
South Africa) which I believe sets forth the way for his and other salient African 
ethical conceptions to be integrated into our predominantly Western bioethical 
thinking. 
 
Biko believes that any attempts at integration where there are inbuilt complexes of 
superiority and inferiority will always be artificial integration. He described the 
society of his day as a society where blacks were treated as perpetual under-16s, 
which I would suggest describes in some way how Western philosophical thinking 
might see African philosophical thinking, namely juvenile, immature and not worthy 
of too much serious attention.  Biko’s belief was that one does not need to plan for or 
actively encourage real integration. Once various groups within a given community 
(the medical ethics community) have asserted themselves to the point that mutual 
respect has to be shown, “then you have the ingredients for a true and meaningful 
integration” (2010: 22). He sees it as a lie to accept that “white values” (I would argue 
it is fair to replace white with western) are necessarily the best (2010: 56) and 
suggests that “someone somewhere along the line will be forced to accept the truth 
and here we believe ours is the truth” (2010: 56). I believe he would call the African 
medical ethics community to consciousness, to the realisation that our African 
philosophy (including, but not exclusively our age-old ubuntu) has an equal claim to 
“truth” and to assert that truth, which, in his thinking then paves the way for true and 
meaningful integration. At the heart of true integration is the provision for each 
element that feels deserving of integration (each person, group, philosophy) to rise 
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and attain the envisioned self. This accords with part of Dube’s definition of ubuntu: 
“Ubuntu defines a process for earning respect by first giving it” (2009: 213). Each 
must be able to attain its style of existence without encroaching on or being thwarted 
by another. Out of this mutual respect for each other and complete freedom of self-
determination, Biko believed that “there will obviously arise a genuine fusion of the 
styles of the various groups. This is true integration” (2010: 22 adapted). 
 
Gibson (2008: 8-9) discusses Fanon’s approach to the Hegelian dialectic and suggests 
that Biko sought a continuation of this dialectic for South Africa. In The Definition of 
Black Consciousness, Biko (2010: 55) applies the Hegelian dialectic (comprising a 
thesis, giving rise to its reaction, an antithesis, which contradicts or negates the thesis, 
with the tension between the two being resolved by means of a synthesis) to suggest a 
way forward for South Africa that does not result in white racists simply being 
replaced by black racists. Gibson, referring to Fanon’s influence on Biko, quotes 
Fanon “at the foundation of the Hegelian dialectic there is absolute reciprocity which 
must be recognised” (2008: 9) [own emphasis]. The black, according to Biko 
"associates everything good with white....so you tend to feel there is something 
incomplete in your humanity, and that your humanity goes with whiteness” (2010: 
55). But opposition to white society could not become a pre-occupation. As “Black 
Consciousness develops there is a need to work out further the quest for a new 
humanity.... What Black Consciousness seeks to do is to produce at the end of the 
process real Black people who do not regard themselves as appendages of white 
society” (2010: 55). In terms of the dialectic, the negation of white racism is black 
unity. But the end is not a “synthesis” of white racism and black unity but a complete 
transcendence where race would not be a factor. Biko is against integration if that 
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means integration in to white society with its values and codes of behaviour 
maintained by whites (Gibson: 2008:9). “If on the other hand by integration you mean 
there shall be free participation by all members of society, catering for the full 
expression of the self in a freely changing society as determined by the will of the 
people, then I am with you” (2010: 26). The relevance of all the above in the area of 
integrating African ethical thinking into Western ethical is self-evident but will be 
expounded upon in 4 below.  
 
 2.4 Summary 
 
In his book The Mind of South Africa (1990) Allister Sparks examins the migrations 
of the Southern African peoples across the continent and analyses the cultures and 
philosophies they brought along with them. He explains that although Africa had 
lagged behind Europe technologically and economically, it was far ahead of Europe in 
terms of its social and political philosophies and systems. These systems, which 
revolved around communal relationships, had developed a deep respect for human 
values and the recognition of the human worth based on a philosophy of humanism 
which he identifies as far more advanced than that found in the European philosophic 
systems at that time.  
 
In this section I have shown that Biko would wholeheartedly endorse this as fact. I 
have identified some of the aspects of African culture that he cherished and which 
have particular relevance to the ethical treatment of patients. These include the 
importance African culture places on people, the lack of inherent suspicion, rejection 
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of individualism above community, communalism, situation-experiencing rather than 
problem-solving, deep spirituality and a closeness to nature.  I have shown how these 
are nothing more or less than the expression of ubuntu which was the basis of his 
thinking and have suggested that it is through the gift of ubuntu that he saw Africa 
giving the world a more human face. 
 
In discussing his understanding of true integration being based on mutual respect 
rather than forced incorporation, I will suggest that ubuntu, while by its very nature 
does not demand respect, is yet deserving of respect, deserving of being recognised as 
an age old philosophy which can give medical ethics a more human face and that 
when it is given the mutual respect it deserves it will earn the right to be integrated 
into our predominantly Western bioethical thinking. 
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3.  Impact of Biko’s philosophy (ubuntu) on some fundamental 
bioethical notions.  
 
In his lecture to mark the 30th anniversary of the death of Steve Biko, former 
president Thabo Mbeki  detailed the colonial association of the African value system 
as one encapsulated by lasciviousness, “it was impossible to be an African and not 
lascivious” (2007: 10),  an indirect reference to the sexual transmission of the 
HIV/AIDS virus, and then, in contradistinction Mbeki posited ubuntu as 
encapsulating the value system that Biko visualized, asking:  
“Why can’t an African world view, such as Ubuntu, be at the centre so 
that we can view other cultures in relationship to it? Ubuntu, which 
reminds us that “a person is a person through other people,” does not 
allow for individualism that overrides the collective interests of a 
community. It stands in contradistinction to the idea that an individual is 
the be-all and end-all, without, at the same time, positing that an 
individual is rightless or dispensable in the grand scheme of things” 
(2007: 15) [emphasis added].  
 
Benatar and Landman have noted that even though South African bioethics has by 
and large responded to the same forces as elsewhere, most notably the United 
Kingdom and the United States, it has also been moulded by some uniquely South 
African experiences. In particular, they write that “the death of Steve Biko (the Black 
Consciousness leader), the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and a peaceful transition to 
democracy with increased focus on human rights have given bioethics in South Africa 
its own dimension” (2006: 239). 
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Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles of bioethics, namely autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and social justice (Beauchamp and Childress: 1979), 
have moulded, and continue to mould, bioethics worldwide. Braude points out that 
“some Western bioethicists assume that these four principles hold universally and that 
to deny them, through a call for cultural difference most notably, means condoning 
barbaric practices such as female genital mutilation and espousing moral relativism.” 
(2009: 2054). Yet, according to Braude, in South Africa the specificity of individual 
bioethics subjects “necessitate the risk of local responses that are equally ‘rational’ to 
their Western counterparts, though they may appear ‘irrational’ in challenging, at the 
very least, the hierarchy, of these four established bioethics principles” (2009: 2055). 
It is not my intention to challenge the hierarchy of these four principles, but to explore 
how Biko’s ubuntuism impacts some of them. 
 
 3.1 Autonomy 
 
“Autonomy, of course, is an elusive concept that has been defined in conflicting 
ways, including accounts that closely relate it to either political concerns for negative 
liberty, moral concerns for a particular substantive way of life, or metaphysical 
concerns for freedom of the will” (Lund: 1998: 12). 
 
  3.1.1 Current critique of the prominence given to autonomy 
 
“Principle-based formulations of bioethical theory have recently come under 
increasing scrutiny, particularly insofar as they give prominence to personal 
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autonomy” (Donchin: 2001: 365). She critiques the dominant conceptualization of 
autonomy and urges an alternative formulation freed from the individualistic 
assumptions that pervade the prevailing framework. She discusses the need for a 
“vision of patient autonomy that joins relational experiences to individuality and 
acknowledges the influence of patterns of power and authority on the exercise of 
patient agency”(2001: 368). Clouser and Gert (1990) critique principilism in general 
and in referring to autonomy say that “its problems are so extensive as to deserve a 
separate article” (1990: 228). Callahan (2003: 288) identifies two key virtues in 
principlism: its reflection of the liberal, individualist culture from which it emerged 
which he believes makes it “culture congenial” and its relatively simple 
conceptualisation and application which in turn makes it particularly attractive to 
clinical decision making. He, however sees principlism per se as too rigid and 
suggests that communitarianism provides a better way forward inasmuch as it 
provides a way of thinking about ethical problems rather than rigid criteria or 
formulas for dealing with them. 
 
Does ubuntu help clear or make more muddy the waters of autonomy? Mnyaka and 
Motlhabi (2009: 70) define the autonomous person, in the western view, as one who 
“acts freely by definition. He acts freely only if he has good reasons for what he does 
(and no better reasons for doing something else). He has good reasons, only if he acts 
in his own ultimate interests. His ultimate interests derive from what he essentially is. 
What he essentially is depends on what is essential to his being that particular 
person.” This definition describes an autonomy that is understood in an absolutist and 
almost exclusivist sense. An autonomous person is thus completely independent, acts 
for his or her own interests and trusts his or her own judgement. Mnyaka and 
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Motlhabi point out however, that in the context of ubuntu, autonomy is understood 
and practised in relation to the community in that it is tied to the role the community 
has assigned to the individual. Individualistic and self-centred acts are seen not just as 
a failure to contribute the well-being of both the person and the community, but as 
bringing about pain, misery and harm to others. Ubuntu is thus “anti-individualism 
and pro communalism, while at the same time is incurably religious” (Sebidi:1988:3 
cited in Mnyaka and Motlhabi: 2009:72). 
 
3.1.2 Communalism and Autonomy 
 
Earlier I mentioned that Gyekye (1997: 35-76) argues convincingly for a moderate or 
restricted communalism as opposed to a radical or unrestricted communalism. 
Unrestricted communalism, which gives little value to individual rights or individual 
autonomy, while maintaining the primacy of the community to the hilt, holds that 
personhood is fully defined by the communal structure. Restricted communalism, on 
the other hand, believes that there are grounds for maintaining that a person is not 
fully defined by the communal or cultural structure. Besides being a social being by 
nature, the human individual is, also by nature, other things as well. These “other 
things” include such essential attributes as rationality, having a moral sense and 
capacity for virtue and, hence, for evaluating and making moral judgements. In other 
words, the individual is capable of choice. He argues that if we do not choose to be 
social – because we are social by nature – neither do we choose to be intelligent, or 
rational beings, or beings with a moral sense. He suggests we use the term mental 
feature as a shorthand for all these other things and then posits: “It is not the 
community that creates this mental feature: this feature would not be natural if created 
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by the community. If the mental feature plays any seminal role in the formation and 
execution of the individual’s goals and plans, as indeed it does, then it cannot be 
persuasively argued that personhood is fully defined and constituted by the communal 
structure or social relationships” (1997: 53). The fact that changes do occur in 
existing communal values is undoubtedly the result of the evaluative activities and 
choices of some autonomous, self-assertive human beings. In other words, “changes 
in culture often reflect, or at least begin in, the self-assertive enterprise” (1997: 54). In 
the light of the autonomous character of its activities, the communal self cannot be 
held as a cramped or shackled self, responding robotically to the ways and demands 
of the communal structure. His thinking is in line with the more recent proposition put 
forward by Etzioni (2011) who distinguishes between authoritarian and responsive 
communitarianism. Responsive communitarianism 
seeks to “balance autonomy with concern for the common good, without a priori 
privileging either of these two core values” (2011: 17) and he is convinced that such a 
communitarianism, which many often see as the polar opposite position of the focus 
on autonomy, exists. 
 
Gyekye goes on to show how moderate communalism does not oppose the doctrine of 
rights (1997: 62) and then, more importantly for this discussion, human dignity. This, 
he asserts (1997: 63) is a natural or fundamental attribute of the human being (in 
agreement with Biko and ubuntu) which “cannot be set at nought by the communal 
structure” and natural membership in the community can never diminish the dignity 
or worth of the individual. He links this dignity with the African belief “that every 
human being is a child of God, imbued with a divine element called soul” (1997: 63). 
More on dignity below. 
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The above is a very concise summary of Gyekye’s moderate communalism. The 
person is both a communal being and an autonomous, self-assertive being with a 
capacity for evaluation and choice. This would seem to be the type of person and the 
type of ubuntu Mbeki described in the quote above in saying: “Ubuntu, which 
reminds us that ‘a person is a person through other people,’ does not allow for 
individualism that overrides the collective interests of a community. It stands in 
contradistinction to the idea that an individual is the be-all and end-all, without, at 
the same time, positing that an individual is rightless or dispensable in the grand 
scheme of things” (2007: 15). At the same time, this type of communalism stands 
against Braude’s statement above that “some Western bioethicists assume that these 
four principles hold universally and that to deny them, through a call for cultural 
difference most notably, means ‘condoning barbaric practices such as female genital 
mutilation and espousing moral relativism’” (2009: 2054). This moderate 
communalism seems to be an answer to Donchin’s search for “a vision of patient 
autonomy that joins relational experiences to individuality and acknowledges the 
influence of patterns of power and authority on the exercise of patient agency” (2001: 
368). 
 
Kasenene (2000: 349-359) brings all this into perspective by pointing out that for 
African people one cannot regard even one’s own life as purely personal property or 
concern. It is the group which is the owner of life and a person is just a link in the 
chain connecting present and future generations (more on this when I discuss 
Spirituality). Thus, a person’s health is the concern of the community, because, in this 
concept of corporate existence, what harms an individual is considered harmful to the 
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community. He points out the danger of paternalism in African society, but, like 
Gyekye, calls for an autonomy which is both individual and communal. In deciding 
on treatment and courses of action in healthcare, there should be cooperation and 
when possible, agreement among all the parties concerned. Unless the patient objects, 
his or her relatives, especially the close ones, should be regarded as part of the team 
which is involved in the patient’s care; therefore they deserve to know about the 
patient’s sickness and treatment and should have a say in the whole healing process. 
Regarding the respective values of beneficence and autonomy, Kasenene 
acknowledges that “some societies regard autonomy as of higher value than 
beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. In general, this should be respected. In 
African culture, however, beneficence has a higher value, which justifies paternalistic 
interventions either by the doctor or by the family who may be in a better condition or 
position than the patient to judge wisely what is best for him or her…and to balance 
the patient’s needs, rights and interests with those of other patients, the family and the 
community as a whole…In African ethical thinking, however, harm may be done in 
order to prevent greater harm either to the patient or to the community as a whole…In 
doing all this  justice must prevail” (2000: 356). All of this calls for Biko’s mutual 
respect before judgement is passed from a western ethical perspective. 
 
Finally on the subject of communalism and autonomy, I return to Sebidi’s statement 
above: “Ubuntu is thus anti-individualism and pro communalism, while at the same 
time is incurably religious” (1988:3 cited in Mnyaka and Motlhabi: 2009:72). More 
now regarding Sebidi’s incurably religious, or what I have previously referred to as 
the deeply spiritual nature of African culture and ubuntu, and its impact on how to 
treat patients ethically. 
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 3.2 Dignity, Spirituality and Traditional Healthcare Practitioners 
 
Biko was correct when he said that the person is the cornerstone of society. He 
elaborates that man – and, it should be added, woman – is valuable in himself or 
herself: “not just his welfare, not his material well-being but just man himself with all 
his ramifications” (2010: 50). Mnyaka and Motlhabi (2009: 66) state that this is the 
worldview of ubuntu and that “according to this worldview, all people have isidima 
(dignity) which makes a person divine and therefore to be respected and valued. Biko, 
ubuntu and African moral theory in general constantly refer to the divine, the 
spiritual, the religious component in any discussion regarding what it means to be 
human. Richardson (2009: 143) describes the ethics of the Enlightenment as 
characterised by universalism, ahistoricism, utilitarianism, individualism, an 
understanding of society as a rational contract, a punctiliar understanding of human 
experience, effectiveness as a moral factor, actions above persons and the priority of 
right over good, and a floating free from religious bases into secularism. “It goes 
without saying that such an ethic is profoundly at odds with the ethics of Africa” 
(2009: 143).  
 
In African thinking, as discussed earlier, the physical and spiritual are inseparable. 
Waite (1992: 214) has suggested that the African understanding of disease should be 
seen as “medico-religious rather than bio-technical.”  Makinde (cited in Murove: 
2009: 166) observes that “while western medical practice sees disease in terms of the 
malfunctioning of the body, in the African context, disease is seen to have a causal 
link between the visible and the invisible world.” Within this paradigm, physical 
causation presupposes spiritual. This all indicates that the western healthcare system 
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does not provide an adequate understanding of  life, death, health and disease in the 
African context. 
 
Part of Biko’s bastardisation of African culture is linked to the way western scientific 
medicine has been seen by its practitioners as superior and infallible in its encounter 
with traditional African medicine since the arrival of the European settlers. However, 
three hundred and fifty years after “colonisation” began, Murove (2009: 159) quotes 
various studies which reveal that most (up to 80%) Africans (urban and rural) visit a 
traditional healer before going to the doctor or the hospital. Murove thus concludes 
that it is an “irrefutable fact that most Africans believe and rely on traditional health 
care practices” and that a genuine dialogue between western and traditional medicine 
“based on unprejudiced listening, would have definitely given rise to an authentic 
African bioethics” (2009: 160). Such an unprejudiced listening based on Biko’s call 
for mutual respect could still lead to an effective integration of western and African 
ethical thought and ought to be seen as a matter of ethical urgency. Maier (1998: 78) 
observes that “in other parts of the developing world, such as Brazil and India, 
traditional medicine has been taken more seriously by governments than in Africa. In 
India, traditional medicine is offered in the hospitals and university curricula. 
Research into traditional African medicines has been minimal, suffering equally 
prejudice and widespread reluctance of the healers themselves to reveal their medical 
secrets.” Surely this represents once again a call to consciousness as Maier implies 
that post-colonial Africa has not yet appreciated the richness of its own indigenous 
health care system. Thus Murove (2009: 174) can rightly claim that “the time is 
overdue for all serious minded scholars to stimulate a proper discourse on African 
bioethics. No medical practice has the monopoly over truth; all stand to learn 
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immensely from each other.”  It is his belief that a genuine understanding of African 
bioethics begins with an understanding of the role of the African traditional doctors 
who have an indispensable role to play because they provide an understanding of 
health almost absent in most western-orientated health institutions. They perform their 
professional duties with greater sensitivity to the web of relationships within which 
the individual is entangled. Believing in both the physical and spiritual causation of 
disease discussed above, and in the communal nature of sickness, their approach is 
always one which involves the immediate physical community as well as the wider 
spiritual community comprising the ancestors. Nabudere (2005: 4) refers to the 
ancestors as the living dead and it is “this existence of the invisible beings that is the 
basis of Ubuntu metaphysics and the belief in the supernatural that play a role in 
African processes of reconciliation.” It is the traditional healer who plays a key role in 
the process of communication and reconciliation as she or he mediates in the physical 
and spiritual communities. 
 
Serbulea (2000: cited in Knapp van Bogaert 2007: 32) points out that “anecdotal 
evidence shows that 70% of healers in suburban areas are charlatans. At the same 
time, special efforts need to be made to differentiate authentic healers from 
charlatans. Some of the criteria for distinguishing a real healer are the family 
connection for generations to a respected leader, his/her acceptance to collaborate 
with modern medicine, and refraining from claiming to cure all diseases.” The 
Traditional Health Practioners Bill (2003) recognises both the important role of 
traditional healers in South African society and the need for their control as it sets out 
to “establish the Interim Traditional Health Practitioners Council of South Africa; to 
provide for a regulatory framework to ensure the efficacy, safety and quality of 
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traditional health care services; to provide for the management and control over the 
registration, training and conduct of practitioners, students and specified categories in 
the traditional health practitioners profession; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith.”  
 
Serbulea (above) does not provide anecdotal evidence regarding how many registered 
medical professionals are charlatans, but how many doctors or traditional healers are 
charlatans is not relevant. What is of importance is that by far the majority of patients 
in South Africa visit both a doctor and a traditional healer when they are sick. This is 
not because they see disease as both physical and spiritual, but because they see, as 
discussed above, all disease as physico-spiritual. This thesis in no way attempts to 
claim or demand that parity in the roles of western/scientific treatment of patients and 
African traditional treatments is the desired goal. It does suggest that as long as sick 
people feel the need to have to choose between the two as if they are opposites that 
will never belong together, as long as they are forced to choose between two cultures 
in matters of life and death, those same sick people are not experiencing an ethical 
approach which has their very best interests at heart from their practitioners. 
 
Based on the above, it is essential that the ethical treatment of patients ought to 
include a recognition, an understanding and a mutual respect of the role played by 
traditional health care practitioners in the lives of most southern African patients. 
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 3.3 Confidentiality 
 
The above discussions on communalism, autonomy, spirituality and traditional 
healers have all emphasised the communal nature of disease in the African context 
and the belief that the individual’s experiences of suffering are also communal. This 
brings into focus the whole question of doctor/patient confidentiality which has for so 
long been part of the discourse or western medical ethics. According to Murove 
(2009: 171) confidentiality is based primarily on atomic individualism and the 
“incorrigibility of the individual who is subsumed from the generality of human 
existence.” Thus, confidentiality implies that the individual has an inviolable right to 
deal with sickness and all matters of health as she/he chooses. If the patient is the 
whole community or family, as is the African belief, then it is at such a level that 
confidentiality is upheld. In this context, the primary aim of the traditional doctor is 
not only to bring healing to the individual patient, but at the same time to ensure that 
harmonious relationships are maintained at all levels of existence. “As the individual 
exists in a state of communion and communicability, the sickness and its causes are 
also revealed to the traditional doctor with or without the consent of the patient. This 
sickness is also a concern for the family or community” (2009: 171) because, as 
Murove earlier explains, the participation in the individual’s illness by the community 
is an authentication of the philosophy behind African bioethics that maintains that an 
individual’s experiences of suffering are also communal. 
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 3.4 Conclusion 
 
“One cannot escape the fact that the culture shared by the majority group in any given 
society must ultimately determine the broad direction taken by the joint culture of that 
society. This need not cramp the style of those who feel differently but on the whole, 
a country in Africa, in which the majority of the people are African must inevitably 
exhibit African values and be truly African in style,” Steve Biko (2010: 26). 
 
It is quite clear from the above discussion that the impact of Biko’s philosophy on 
bioethical issues is immense and often at odds with Western ethical thinking, 
especially in the context of principlism. Murove sums up a way forward that echoes 
the thinking of Biko: “We should be able to devise an effective health care system in 
post-colonial Africa by creating a dialogue between African traditional health care 
practices and inherited western health care systems and integrating them. These two 
health care systems should share the same space with neither claiming superiority. 
The African health care practice of the future should be the vibrant product of cross-
breeding between the mechanistic world view, as entrenched in western medical 
practice, and the holistic world view of African traditional health care” (2009: 174). 
 
From the place of the living dead, Biko would smile and nod in approval. 
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4. Integrating Biko’s and other salient African ethical conceptions 
into our predominantly Western bioethical thinking is a moral 
requirement. 
 
Metz (2007, 2010) and Metz & Gaie (2010), has written extensively on African Moral 
Theory. In Toward an African Moral Theory (2007: 323) Metz states: “I seek a theory 
inspired by ubuntu” and then goes on to give a basic statement of the African moral 
theory this dissertation suggests would give to medical ethics a more human face. He 
summarises this theory as follows: “An act is right just insofar it is a way of prizing 
harmony with others, i.e., relationships in which people share a way of life and are in 
solidarity with one another. An action is wrong if and only if it fails to honour 
relationships in which we identify with others and exhibit goodwill toward them” 
(2009: 339). By his own admission this theory is still incomplete and imprecise, but it 
encapsulates the thinking behind ubuntu, namely that a person is a person through 
other persons and I am because we are. It moves our ethical thinking away from the 
primacy of self towards the primacy of us, which in a sense is what Etzioni is calling 
for in his New Golden Rule which Lund (1998: 10) summarises as follows: “His 
central thesis is that societies should seek to balance “universal individual rights and 
the common good” and that citizens should follow his new golden rule: “respect 
society’s moral order as you would have society respect and uphold your autonomy.” 
 
The Kantian believes that, in addition to duties to others, people have duties to 
themselves, specifically to protect and develop a capacity for autonomy. For the 
utilitarian, people have a duty to maximise their own well-being. Thus, in an analogy 
which has a person living alone on an island, Metz (2009: 340) illustrates that the 
Kantian and the utilitarian can act both morally and immorally in their solitude. “By 
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contrast, African ethics imply that morality is possible only through interaction with 
others. A person who is utterly alone might be more or less happy but not more or less 
dutiful. Morality, from a resolutely African perspective, arises only from 
relationships.” 
 
Two recent newspaper articles illustrate my normative claim that integrating Biko’s 
and other salient African ethical conceptions into our predominantly Western 
bioethical thinking is a moral requirement. The titles themselves explain their 
inclusion in this section: Health and Healthcare Humanised (Levine, Reid and 
Colvin: 2014) and Why the humanity of Ebola’s victims should not be forgotten 
(Frankfurter: 2014). 
 
In the former, Levine, Reid and Colvin (2014) comment on the decision of the 
National Research Foundation in South Africa to recognise the medical humanities as 
a new knowledge field. They describe the medical humanities as an attempt to move 
beyond “the binaries that have separated the worlds of the medical and the scientific 
from the domains of the personal and the humanistic.” A recent conference, Medical 
Humanities in Africa, hosted at the University of Cape Town on Aug 28-29, 2014, 
was described in detail, some of the topics covered being How are medical 
humanities in Africa different from elsewhere and What informs how we speak, think 
and act in relation to health, medicine, the body, healing and the human. The call was 
for both medical practitioners to be trained and supported and patients to be supported 
more holistically with a view to the African concept of disease, bearing in mind the 
cultural norms that inform how we think, speak and act, as patients and practitioners, 
in relation to health, medicine, the body, healing and the human in Africa. Biko’s 
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words that Africa should reflect things African because the majority of her people are 
African seem to echo in the above. 
 
In the second article, Frankfurter (2014) reports on the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, 
a news story which has dominated the news headlines worldwide during the final 
stage of my writing this dissertation. In the article he reports on how the response of 
local populations to the interventions of the medical authorities has often been 
interpreted as “ignorance and a refusal to accept that the disease can be tackled by 
Western medicine.” Medical authorities responded to this “ignorance” with a “new 
round of educational initiatives arguing against local healers and traditional 
medicine.”  The author pointed out that Ebola patients “can be considered mere 
disease-carriers rather than complicated human beings – and although at the highest 
levels reducing transmission is the top priority, neglecting the humane aspects of care 
can gravely undermine the public health response.”  
 
The article highlighted for me the need for an ethic that incorporates the elements of 
Biko’s ubuntu thinking that I have highlighted, integrated, beginning with Biko’s way 
of mutual respect, into our current ethical thinking in order to make it whole or 
complete, and in so doing, giving medical ethics a more human face. Integrating 
Biko’s and other salient African ethical conceptions into our predominantly Western 
bioethical thinking is a moral requirement. 
 
Beauchamp and Childress (2001: 2-6) speak about normative and non-normative 
claims in the development of ethics. If a claim is normative, the claim is that the 
normative claim has normative force, it establishes moral standards for everyone. 
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Non-normative claims are empirical, in which case they describe what all people 
believe. They defend their position declaring that non-normative claims are about 
what is universal in moral belief, while normative claims are about what should be 
universal in moral belief. Normative ethics attempts to answer the question, “Which 
general norms for the guidance of conduct should we accept and why” (2001: 2). At 
the same time, in asking whether norms are absolute, they acknowledge that it is no 
objection in the common morality that, in some circumstances they can be justifiably 
overridden in some circumstances. “Principles, duties and rights are not absolute or 
unconditional merely because they are universal” (2001: 5). 
 
At this stage of my thesis it is clear that my central claim is that more emphasis needs 
to be accorded to Biko’s and ubuntu’s emphasis on the communitarian. Etzioni (1998) 
suggests that there is an “autonomy-community continuum on which societies and 
historical eras can be located and that there is a ‘golden mean’ that gives both their 
due” and his conviction is “that in the present period we have strayed too far towards 
the autonomy end of the continuum is clearly the rationale, the very raison d’etre, for 
the communitarian movement” (1998: 35). Once again, Biko’s ubuntuism and Biko’s 
integration beckon attention, particularly as they call communitarianism to the fore. 
 
Etzioni, who I earlier compared with Gyekye regarding the moderate/responsive 
communitarianism they espouse over the authoritarian/radical communitarianism 
which receives more press, finds “the one major reason many, especially in the West, 
reject this kind of communitarianism on normative grounds is that they hold 
autonomy in high regard” (2011: 16). Another reason is methodological, a reason he 
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believes deserves to be briefly discussed because it points to a rather different kind of 
communitarianism:  
The methodological point draws on the precept that sound normative positions 
cannot be derived from one overarching value. Societies are complex beings, 
composed of people who hold different values and have different needs and 
interests. It follows that one is much more likely to reach a normatively 
defensible position if one draws on multiple values, rather than presumes that 
one value pre-empts or trumps all the others (2011:17). 
 
He then highlights that one should not be unduly troubled by the resulting tensions 
and contradictions that result from drawing on multiple values, such as liberty and 
equality, or, autonomy and the common good, among other core values. “We shall see 
that there are fruitful ways to work out these differences without making all other 
values subordinate to one” (2011: 18) 
 
I suggest that these “fruitful ways” lie in seeing the value that Biko’s views on 
integration that can be applied to the elements of ubuntu/culture that he cherished, can 
bring to medical ethics which examine them from a point of mutual respect. 
 
In her presidential address to the International Association of Bioethics in 2011, 
Nikola Biller-Andorno identifies some of the challenges facing the global bioethics 
movement, one being that bioethics is too elitist, leading to the “much discussed 
worry…that bioethics as such is a Western undertaking with an imperialist impetus” 
(2011: 432). She mentions a previous president, Solly Benatar’s comment: “Ethics is 
about relationships, of course” (Benatar: 2003) and then goes on to say: 
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This may not be as obvious as it sounds. A good deal of bioethical 
reasoning is concerned with the autonomous, rational individuals that 
inhabit sterile theoretical worlds. This perspective seems to neglect utterly 
what many would say counts most in a fulfilled life, that is, flourishing 
human relationships. I would venture to say that flourishing relationships 
are a precondition of human flourishing (Biller-Andorno: 2011: 432). 
 
She then goes on to discuss what she means by “flourishing relationships” by asking 
and attempting to answer the question regarding whether we are making full use of 
bioethics as an asset. Without using the words describes a world and a bioethics with 
a more human face: 
…a world in which the sheer joy about the existence and thriving of 
another – think of your partner or friends, your children or grandchildren 
– can be felt and can enrich our selves; a world in which attending to an 
other is experienced as meaningful and worthwhile; a world in which 
caring for others can be balanced with caring for oneself, and in which the 
work of care is fairly distributed; a world in which everyone can expect to 
be cared for when needed (2011: 434). 
 
She describes, I propose, what medical ethics could look like if Biko’s and other 
African ethical conceptions were to be integrated (bearing in mind Biko’s concept of 
integration) into our predominantly Western bioethical thinking and hence my claim 
that integrating Biko’s and other salient African ethical conceptions into our 
predominantly Western bioethical thinking is a moral requirement. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Biko (2010: 75) reminisces about his high school life when he had a friend whose 
hero was Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda. This friend loved Banda’s often quoted 
statement: “This is a black man’s country; any white man who does not like it must 
pack up and go.” He then goes on to say how talk like this inspired him, as a 
schoolboy, to believe that the myth of the white man’s invincibility was broken. 
“When fellow Africans were thinking like that how could we still be harbouring ideas 
of continued servitude? We knew he had no right to be there; we wanted to remove 
him from our table, strip the table of all trappings put on it by him, decorate it in true 
African style, settle down and then ask him to join us on our own terms if he liked.” 
The thought of the more mature Biko, as explored in this dissertation, is not so much 
one of “stripping the table” but rather a call to recognise and believe that things 
African have as much right to be part of the smorgasbord as the things already on the 
table. 
 
Does Steve Biko have more to offer medical ethics than his death? The answer has to 
be a loud and clear Yes! The philosophy which he brought to bear on the political 
situation of the 1970’s, conscientizing people to realise who they really were, is a 
philosophy, which if brought to bear on the current teaching of, and general discourse 
on, medical ethics in South Africa and Africa at large, will enrich and make even 
more humane, the ethical treatment of patients. 
 
In writing about Steve Biko in his Long Walk to Freedom (Mandela: 1994), Nelson 
Mandela says; “We must not allow his contribution to be forgotten”. As stated earlier, 
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that statement sums up the goal of this research report. His contribution will not be 
forgotten if, in the teaching and practise of medical ethics, with mutual respect from 
all sides, room is made on the predominantly westernised table for the integration of 
African moral cuisine. 
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